A hermeneutical analysis on the recognition of China as a market economy after 2016 = Uma análise hermenêutica sobre o reconhecimento da China como economia de mercado em 2016 by Amaral Júnior, Alberto & Heringer, Aline Pereira de Carvalho
doi: 10.5102/rdi.v15i1.5053 A hermeneutical analysis on the recognition 
of China as a market economy after 2016*
Uma análise hermenêutica sobre o 
reconhecimento da China como economia de 
mercado em 2016
Alberto Amaral Júnior**
Aline Pereira de Carvalho Heringer***
abstraCt
This article seeks to analyze the possibility of  recognition of  China as 
a market economy for purposes of  antidumping investigations, especially 
in light of  China’s Protocol of  Accession to the World Trade Organization 
(Protocol of  Accession). It is assumed that with the extinction of  Article 
15(a)(ii) of  the Protocol there shall be an automatic grant of  market eco-
nomy treatment to China from December 2016 on. In this article, we will 
analyze legal aspects and the debate over the possible interpretations of  
Article 15 of  the Protocol of  Accession, in view of  China’s “sui generis” 
economical practices. In view of  China’s relevant role and considering the 
economic dependence of  WTO Members towards Chinese economy, this 
issue should be carefully evaluated by all interested WTO Members, most 
preferably within WTO Dispute Settlement Body.
Keywords: International law. International Trade Law. Multilateral Trading 
System. World Trade Organization. Antidumping Agreement. Market Eco-
nomy. China. 
resumo
Este artigo busca analisar a possibilidade de reconhecimento da China 
como economia de mercado, para fins de investigações antidumping, espe-
cialmente à luz do Protocolo de Adesão da China à Organização Mundial 
do Comércio (Protocolo de Adesão). Parte-se da hipótese de que com a 
extinção do Art. 15 (a)(ii) do Protocolo de Adesão haverá concessão auto-
mática de tratamento de economia de mercado à China, em investigações 
antidumping, a partir de dezembro de 2016. Neste artigo, analisaremos os 
aspectos legais e o debate sobre as possíveis interpretações do artigo 15 do 
Protocolo de Adesão, tendo em vista as práticas econômicas “sui generis” 
da China. Dessa análise, conclui-se que os textos dos artigos 15(a) e 15(d) do 
Protocolo de Adesão devem ser lidos e interpretados com cautela, à luz das 
regras de interpretação do direito internacional. A afirmação de que a expi-
ração do Art. 15(a)(ii) concederia automaticamente status de economia de 
mercado à China parece excessivamente rígida e desconsidera as disposições 
remanescente do Art. 15. Em vista do posicionamento relevante e da de-
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pendência econômica dos Países Membros com relação 
à China, a questão deve ser ponderada com prudência, 
com envolvimento de todos os Estados interessados, 
preferencialmente, em âmbito do Órgão de Solução de 
Controvérsias da OMC.  
Palavras-chave: Direito Internacional. Comércio In-
ternacional. Sistema multilateral de comércio. Orga-
nização Mundial do Comércio. Acordo Antidumping. 
Economia de mercado. China.
1. introduCtion
In September 1997, the World Bank, in its report en-
titled “China 2020: China Engaged”, predicted what the 
benefits to China would be in the scenario of  a broadly 
integrated global economy. The World Bank estimated 
that if  China’s international economic engagement and 
trade liberalization plan were implemented, Chinese 
gross participation in world trade could triple by 2020. 
The World Bank also predicted a drastic increase in Chi-
nese imports and exports in light of  its large consumer 
market and cheap workforce. These were seen as ena-
bling China to become the second largest importer and 
exporter in the world following the United States (US)1.
The World Bank estimates were correct. Since the 
late 1970s, the Chinese system has gone from a closed 
and centralized economy to a market oriented system. 
In ten years, China multiplied their exports by a factor 
of  4.8 and their imports by 5.6. The impact of  China’s 
entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) was 
such that since 2009 it has become the world’s leading 
exporter of  goods, surpassing both Germany and the 
US. These developments demonstrate the relevance 
of  international trade in the economic growth strategy 
of  China – today one of  the largest economies in the 
world.
China’s accession to the WTO in November 2001 
represented an important political decision taken by the 
Chinese government to reinsert the country into the 
world trade dynamic, but it has also become a major 
challenge for the WTO. When China joined the WTO, 
the Member States considered that the Chinese eco-
1  DASGUPTA, Dipak. China 2020: China engaged: integration 
with the global economy. Available at: <http://documents.world-
bank.org/curated/en/656981468743976946/China-2020-China-
engaged-integration-with-the-global-economy>.
nomy was not operating under prevailing market con-
ditions because of  the high degree of  state interference 
in domestic industries. Therefore, in March 1987, the 
WTO constituted a Working Party on the Accession of  
China to the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade to analyze and negotiate the terms of  China’s 
status as a contracting party of  the GATT 1947. The 
analysis developed by the Working Group for the Ac-
cession of  China to the WTO resulted in the Proto-
col of  Accession of  People’s Republic of  China to the 
WTO (Protocol of  Accession), one of  the documents 
that formalized the country’s entry into that Organiza-
tion in 2001.
The Protocol of  Accession that was approved did 
not call for immediate, integrated entry, but rather for 
a gradual and conditioned process of  entry into the 
WTO. The document contains transitional terms and 
rules for gradual trade liberalization that allow Mem-
ber States to adopt exceptional measures towards China 
that were accepted by the Chinese themselves. For ins-
tance, Article 15 (a) (ii) of  the Protocol of  Accession 
reserves the right of  other Member States to adopt al-
ternative methodologies for calculating normal values 
in antidumping investigations against Chinese imports 
in cases where Chinese exporters are not able to de-
monstrate that market conditions prevail in the markets 
similar to that of  the product under investigation.
Unsurprisingly, Article 15 has been the source of  
much controversy in both academic and political circles. 
Article 15 (d) provides that Article 15 (a) (ii) is to expi-
re fifteen years after China’s entry into the WTO, i.e., 
as of  December 11, 2016. Consequently, any explicit 
reference to alternative methodologies for normal va-
lue calculation in antidumping investigations involving 
Chinese imports would no longer be valid according to 
this reading of  the terms of  the Protocol of  Accession. 
Yet there are divergent interpretations of  the terms of  
Article 15 (d) of  the Protocol of  Accession regarding 
antidumping investigations occurring after December 
11, 2016. On one side, there are those who argue that 
the expiration of  the second part of  Article 15 (a) in 
December 2016 means China must automatically be 
treated as a market economy in antidumping investi-
gations. Others maintain that there is nothing in Arti-
cle 15 that stipulates an automatic granting of  market 
economy status to China upon that date. Lastly, a third 
approach suggests that, although automatic recognition 
of  China as a market economy cannot be deduced from 
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the text of  Article 15 (d), the expiration of  the second 
part of  Article 15 (a) means that it is no longer possi-
ble to adopt alternative methodologies for normal value 
calculation in antidumping investigations involving Chi-
na. Therefore, the burden of  proof  would be reversed, 
requiring interested parties to demonstrate that market 
conditions do not prevail in the investigated domestic 
market.
The potential impact of  changes to the Protocol of  
Accession explains the issue’s extreme relevance and 
the amount of  discussion it has attracted in the field 
of  international commerce. The world’s dependence on 
Chinese imports is spreading at the same time as dis-
cussion of  the impact of  Chinese importations on the 
economies of  the Member States increases, especially 
discussion of  unfair competition. Whatever resolution 
comes out of  the debate, that understanding will signi-
ficantly influence how antidumping rights are applied 
to Chinese imports in the coming years, and therefore 
potentially affect the economies of  China itself  as well 
as the other Member States.
For instance, Australia granted market economy sta-
tus to China in 2005 and since then its ability to deal 
with dumping practices by Chinese producers has decli-
ned significantly, as discussed in a Workshop organized 
by the European Commission: the number of  antidum-
ping investigations fell by 50%, as have the number of  
investigations that resulted in the application of  anti-
dumping duties. In addition, the average value of  anti-
dumping duties applied fell by more than 80% in rela-
tion to the amounts previously applied to the measure2.
In this paper, we first analyze different possible sce-
narios for future antidumping investigations involving 
China. Following that analysis, and to better unders-
tand the debates, we study the concept of  market eco-
nomy, with a special regard for the sui generis nature of  
China’s economy, both in general and in terms of  anti-
dumping rights as they have been adopted by interna-
tional organizations, the European Union (EU) and the 
US. Finally, drawing from respected interpretations of  
international law, especially those adopted by the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), the Articles 15 (a) and 
2  EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. Directorate-general for ex-
ternal policies. Policy department. Workshop: market economy 
status for China after 2016?. Available at: <http://www.euro-
parl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/535023/EXPO_
STU(2016)535023_EN.pdf>. 
15 (d) of  the Protocol of  Accession will be studied in 
detail in order to examine their textual ambiguity. 
2. the impliCations of reCognizing China as 
a market eConomy
One of  the interpretations of  Article 15 of  the Pro-
tocol of  Accession holds that China is to be automati-
cally recognized as a market economy starting on De-
cember 11, 2016 and, as such, it should not be forced 
to follow a methodology for determining price compa-
rability in antidumping investigations that is different 
from other Member States, or risk being found in viola-
tion of  the principle of  good faith.3 
According to this understanding, Article 15 (a) (ii) 
has expired, so the remaining part of  Article 15 (a) no 
longer justifies the adoption of  alternative methodolo-
gies for the calculation of  normal values in antidumping 
investigations against Chinese imports. Rather, now 
the use of  alternative methodologies would represent 
an abuse of  antidumping rights and a breach of  good 
faith. For these analysts, the second part of  Article 15 
(d) was always understood to mean that 15 years after 
its accession to the WTO, China would be considered 
as a market economy; in other words, as establishing 
the date at which China would be treated the same as 
the other Member States in antidumping investigations. 
When the bilateral agreement for China’s accession to 
the WTO, the basis for the Protocol of  Accession, was 
reached between China and the US, the White House 
issued the following statement:
The agreed protocol provisions ensure that Ame-
rican firms and workers will have strong protection 
against unfair trade practices including dumping and 
subsidies. The US and China have agreed that we will 
be able to maintain our current antidumping methodo-
3  RAO, Weijia. China’s market economy status under WTO anti-
dumping laws after 2016. Tsinghua China Law Review, v. 5, 2013. YU, 
Yanning. Rethinking China’s market economy status in trade remedy 
disputes after 2016: concerns and challenges. Asian Journal of  WTO 
and International Health Law and Policy, v. 8, 2013. TIETJE, Christian; 
NOWROT, Karsten. Myth or reality? China’s market economy sta-
tus under WTO anti-dumping law after 2016. Policy Papers on Trans-
national Economic Law, n. 34, Transnational Economic Law Research 
Center, 2011. GRAAFSMA, F. Kumashova, E. China’s protocol of  
accession and the anti-dumping agreement: temporary derogation 
or permanent modification? Global Trade and Customs Journal, n. 4, p. 
154–59, apr. 2014. 
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logy (treating China as a non-market economy) in future 
antidumping cases. This provision will remain in force 
for 15 years after China’s accession to the WTO.4 
In regard to the EU position, paragraph 55 of  the 
Explanatory Statement attached to the Council’s deci-
sion established its position on China’s accession to the 
WTO:
The EU’s present legislation which provides 
specific procedures for dealing with cases of  alleged 
dumping by Chinese exporters, which may not yet 
be operating in normal market economy conditions, 
will remain available for up to fifteen years after 
China enters the WTO.5
In a workshop of  the Public Policy Department of  
the European Parliament held to address the issue, Jean-
-François Bellis criticized the interpretation that nothing 
shall change in December 2016 regarding antidumping 
investigations involving China.6 Bellis considers that 
the granting of  market economy status to China by a 
Member State would only have practical significance 
until December 11, 2016. After that date, however, re-
gardless the stipulations for non-market economies in 
the domestic law of  a Member State, the normal value 
of  imports from China should be determined based on 
Chinese prices and costs. 
This analysis would also be shared by the WTO 
Appellate Body, citing the following excerpt from the 
Body Report in the EC v. China Fasterners case:
For lawyers and governmental officials dealing with 
antidumping law and practice, the 11 December 
2016 is certainly not a myth – it is reality. From 
that date onwards, it will be almost impossible – at 
least from the perspective of  WTO law – to make 
a determination of  the normal value of  products 
targeted by an antidumping proceeding on the 
bases of  analogous third country methodology. 7
4  US: China bilateral WTO agreement, antidumping and sub-
sidies methodology, Third WTO Ministerial Conference, Seattle, 
Washington, 1999.
5  Proposal for council decision establishing the community posi-
tion within the ministerial conference set up by the agreement es-
tablishing the World Trade Organization on the accession of  the 
people’s Republic of  China to the World Trade Organization, §55, 
(2001). Available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/
rep/1/2001/EN/1-2001-517-EN-F1-1.Pdf>.
6  EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. Directorate-general for ex-
ternal policies. Policy department. Workshop: market economy 
status for China after 2016?. Available at: <http://www.euro-
parl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/535023/EXPO_
STU(2016)535023_EN.pdf>.
7  EC: definitive anti-dumping measures on certain iron or steel 
fasteners from China. Appellate Body Report. DS397:2011.
Tietje and Nowrot also share this understanding8. 
The authors warn that from December 2016 on it 
should be virtually impossible – at least from the pers-
pective of  WTO law – to justify calculating normal va-
lue in antidumping investigations based on an alternati-
ve methodology.
Based on a systematic approach of  the antidumping 
law according to which the Protocol of  Accession is 
read as an international treaty that is a part of  the mul-
tilateral system of  the WTO (a single undertaking), and 
on the principle of  presumption of  consistency, the au-
thors concluded that with the extinction of  Article 15 
(a) (ii), China shall receive market economy status. After 
the extinction of  Article 15 (a) (ii), there is no longer any 
legal basis in the Protocol of  Accession that justifies the 
adoption of  an alternative methodology. Consequently, 
since no adjustment is necessary for price comparability 
evaluation in antidumping investigations regarding Chi-
nese products, it is understood that the country posses-
ses adequate market economy conditions.
3. if China is not reCognized as market 
eConomy: the appliCable alternative 
methodology
Another interpretative analysis of  Article 15 of  the 
Protocol of  Accession, directly opposed to the one pre-
sented above, sustains that China should not be accor-
ded market economy status from December 11, 2016 
forward.9 For these analysts, there is nothing in the Pro-
tocol of  Accession that indicates an automatic granting 
of  market economy status to China upon the extinction 
of  Article 15 (a) (ii), unless the condition set forth in the 
first part of  Article 15 (d) is fulfilled; that is, until China 
has demonstrated that it is a market economy under the 
domestic law of  the importing Member States.
Even in the case that Article 15 (a) (ii) loses effect 
after December 2016, other provisions of  Article 15 (a) 
8  TIETJE, Christian; NOWROT, Karsten. Myth or reality? Chi-
na’s market economy status under WTO anti-dumping law after 
2016. Policy Papers on Transnational Economic Law, n. 34, Transnational 
economic law research center, 2011.
9 O‘CONNOR, Bernard. The myth of  China and market economy sta-
tus in 2016. Available at: <http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/files/
oconnorresponse.pdf>.  RUESSMANN, L.; BECK, J. 2016 and the 
application of  an NME methodology to Chinese producers in anti-
dumping investigations. Global Trade and Customs Journal, v. 8, 2014. 
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that will remain valid past this date must be taken into 
consideration: the second part of  Article 15 (d) clearly 
provides that “only the provisions of  Article 15 (a) (ii) 
shall expire” and not all the terms of  Article 15 (a). Ac-
cording to the authors who read the clause this way, the 
wording of  Article 15 (a) (i) implies that China is not 
a market economy and that the burden of  proving the 
contrary falls to Chinese exporters. If  market economy 
status were automatically granted to China, the text of  
Article 15 (a) (i) would be meaningless, for in the event 
all Member States were to automatically consider China 
a market economy after December 2016, what would 
be the rationale behind the requirement that Chinese 
exporters prove market conditions prevail at home? Si-
milarly, the provisions of  the first and third parts of  
Article 15 (d) – the ones that deal with the recognition 
of  China as a market economy by each Member State – 
would be empty.
On this point, the defenders of  this interpretation 
appeal to the principle of  interpretative efficacy, whi-
ch requires that a treaty be interpreted in such a way 
as to give meaning and effect to all its terms, implying 
that no provision may be interpreted in such a way that 
annuls the effect of  another provision of  the same trea-
ty.10 Accordingly, it would be impossible to interpret the 
second part of  Article 15 (d) in a way that renders its 
other provisions completely devoid of  effect and mea-
ning. These are the arguments used to affirm that auto-
matically conceding the status of  market economy to 
China in December 2016 is mistaken. It is important to 
question, however, what would happen when Chinese 
producers are unable to meet the requirements of  Ar-
ticle 15 (a) (i) and 15 (d) – i.e., what happens when they 
do not demonstrate market economy conditions for the 
investigated area – and Article 15 (a) (ii) has already ex-
pired. It is worth exploring. The provisions of  Article 
15 (a) (i), as seen above, indicate that when an individual 
producer can demonstrate that market economy condi-
tions prevail in its industry or sector, Chinese prices and 
costs for the industry should be used to determine whe-
ther the exporter is engaging in dumping. Thus, Article 
15 (a) (i) imposes the burden of  proof  on demonstra-
ting the existence of  market economy conditions in its 
sector on the Chinese producer.
10 CANADA - Term of  Patent Protection (Canada - Patents) 
(WT/DS170/R). Panel Report. Appellate Body Report DS170. 
2000. par. 6.49.
The article does not specify the requirements or 
standards to be observed in this demonstration, howe-
ver, in a systematic analysis of  Article 15, we observed 
that the provisions of  Article 15 (d) indicate that the law 
of  the importing country would determine the requi-
rements for a market economy. Therefore, the authors 
conclude that the rule to be applied in Article 15 (a) (i) 
is the one established in the domestic law of  the impor-
ting Member. What if  Chinese producers cannot meet 
these requirements and Article 15 (a) (ii) had already 
expired? In that case Article 15 should be applied, as 
it provides the use of  alternative methodology in anti-
dumping investigation that does not use Chinese prices 
and costs.
At the Workshop promoted by European 
Parliament’s Public Policy Department, O’Connor ar-
gued that a restrictive textual analysis of  the term “ba-
sed” would indicate that the rules set out in sub-para-
graphs (i) and (ii) of  Article 15 (a) would not need to 
be applied rigidly, allowing a different application from 
that provided for in those sub items. All the authors 
who stand by this position foresee serious economic 
consequences if  the understanding that China should 
be recognized as a market economy by December 2016 
prevails. The authors defend that the recognition would 
promote a significant weakening of  antidumping rights 
and an increase in Chinese imports that would directly 
impact production and employment in the importing 
Member State.
4. if China is not reCognized as a market 
eConomy but the burden of proof is inverted 
The last interpretation to be analyzed argues that there 
is no provision in Article 15 of  the Protocol of  Accession 
implying a mandatory recognition of  China as a market 
economy after December 2016.11 What is different from 
11 MIRANDA, Jorge. Implementation of  the shift in burden of  
proof  approach to interpreting paragraph 15 of  China’s protocol of  
accession. Global Trade and Custom Lae, v. 11, 2016. POSNER, Theo-
dore. A comment on interpreting paragraph 15 of  China’s protocol 
of  accession by Jorge Miranda. Global Trade & Customs, 146, 2014. 
SPADANO, Lucas. O tratamento da China como economia (não) de mer-
cado após 2016. Em Observatório de Defesa Comercial da Confed-
eração Nacional da Indústria (CNI). 2013. THORSTENSEN, Vera; 
RAMOS, Daniel; MULLER, Carolina. O reconhecimento da China 
como economia de mercado: o dilema de 2016. Revista Brasileira de 
Comércio Exterior, ano 26, n. 112, jul./set. 2012.
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the view presented above, in this analysis it is held that 
some change must occur due to the extinction of  item 
15 (a) (ii), since the part that expires must have had some 
effect while it was in force. This positioning suggests 
that a procedural change should occur due to the elimi-
nation of  Article 15 (a) (ii). More specifically, it is argues 
that after December 2016 there would be a reversal of  
the burden of  proof  regarding market economy condi-
tions demonstration, whether general or sectorial, prevail 
in China.12 Currently, Member States proceed on the pre-
mise that true market conditions do not prevail in China. 
From December 11, 2016 on, however, this interpretation 
maintains that it should be necessary for the importing 
Member State to demonstrate the absence of  genuine 
market conditions in China before the product’s Chinese 
price and costs are not used to determine “normal value.”
In making this point, advocates of  this interpreta-
tion argue for the application of  the provisions con-
tained in the Interpretative Note to Article VI of  the 
GATT 1994 which contemplates exceptions to the re-
gular system of  normal value calculation established in 
the Antidumping Agreement (ADA). The Interpretati-
ve Note aimed to correct potential distortions arising 
from, for example, dumping margins greater than those 
that would exist if  the normal value of  the exports was 
established on the basis of  what the products’ or like 
products’ price would be if  market conditions prevailed 
in the domestic market. 
Even if  December 2016 is taken as the deadline for 
the application of  the system provided in the Proto-
col of  Accession, Member States would be able to have 
recourse to the provisions of  the general rule establi-
shed in the Interpretative Note above mentioned. Un-
like the second part of  Article 15 (d) of  the Protocol 
of  Accession, the Interpretative Note determines that 
whoever claims the right to apply an alternative metho-
dology carries the burden of  proof. Consequently, after 
December 11, 2016 there would be a reversal of  the 
burden of  proof  with respect to antidumping investiga-
tions involving China. 
In European Communities v. Fasteners, in a footno-
te, the Appellate Body examines the Interpretative Note 
as follows13:
12 MIRANDA, Jorge. Implementation of  the shift in burden of  
proof  approach to interpreting paragraph 15 of  China’s protocol of  
accession. Global Trade and Custom Lae, v. 11, 2016.
13 EC – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or 
We observe that the second Ad Note to Article 
VI:1 refers to a “country which has a complete or 
substantially complete monopoly of  its trade” and 
“where all domestic prices are fixed by the State”. 
This appears to describe a certain type of  NME, 
where the State monopolizes trade and sets all 
domestic prices. The second Ad Note to Article 
VI:1 would thus not on its face be applicable to 
lesser forms of  NMEs that do not fulfill both 
conditions, that is, the complete or substantially 
complete monopoly of  trade and the fixing of  all 
prices by the State.
In this regard, the Appellate Body argues that there 
are different levels of  economies that do not adequately 
demonstrate free market dynamics. The Interpretative 
Note could be applied only to those that wholly fulfilled 
two conditions: (i) when a complete or nearly complete 
monopoly of  trade exists and (ii) where all prices are 
fixed by the State. 
In the Legal Opinion of  the European Parliament’s 
legal sector dated of  June 25, 2015, the same interpreta-
tive view is followed, however, an additional solution is 
also presented14. Although the opinion does not main-
tain that China should receive automatic market eco-
nomy status from December 2016 on, it proposes that 
subsequent to that date it will no longer be possible for 
Member States to adopt an alternative methodology for 
the calculation of  normal value in antidumping inves-
tigations against Chinese imports based on Art 15 (a) 
(ii). The Legal Opinion esteems that the alternative me-
thodology can be applied by adapting the EU legal and 
administrative framework to those cases where it has 
found that China does not comply with the “5 Criteria” 
provided for in Article 2.7 (c) of  the Antidumping Re-
gulation of  the EU15:
A claim under subparagraph (b) must be made 
in writing and contain sufficient evidence that 
the producer operates under market economy 
conditions, that is if:
(i) decisions of  firms regarding prices, costs and 
inputs, including for instance raw materials, cost of  
technology and labour, output, sales and investment, 
Steel Fasteners from China. Rappelate Body Report. DS397:2011, 
parag. 285.
14 NEERGAARD, Anders; AUERSPERGER MATIC, An-
drej. Parecer legal do parlamento europeu. Bruxelas: 2015. Disponível 
em: <http://www.vieuws.eu/eutradeinsights/wp-content/up-
loads/2015/10/Extract-of-EP-legal-opinion-on-market-economy-
status-for-China.pdf>.
15 ANTIDUMPING Regulation of  the EU on protection against 
dumped imports from countries not members of  the European 
Community, 1225/2009. Available at: <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/docs/2010/april/tradoc_146035.pdf>.
JÚ
N
IO
R,
 A
lb
er
to
 A
m
ar
al;
 H
E
RI
N
G
E
R,
 A
lin
e 
Pe
re
ira
 d
e 
Ca
rv
alh
o.
 A
 h
er
m
en
eu
tic
al 
an
aly
sis
 o
n 
th
e 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 o
f 
Ch
in
a 
as
 a
 m
ar
ke
t e
co
no
m
y 
af
te
r 2
01
6.
 R
ev
ist
a 
de
 D
ire
ito
 In
te
rn
ac
io
na
l, 
Br
as
íli
a, 
v. 
15
, n
. 1
, 2
01
8 
p.
22
1-
23
7
228
are made in response to market signals reflecting 
supply and demand, and without significant State 
interference in this regard, and costs of  major 
inputs substantially reflect market values; 
(ii) firms have one clear set of  basic accounting 
records which are independently audited in line 
with international accounting standards and are 
applied for all purposes; 
(iii) the production costs and financial situation 
of  firms are not subject to significant distortions 
carried over from the former non-market economy 
system, in particular in relation to depreciation of  
assets, other write-offs, barter trade and payment 
via compensation of  debts; 
(iv) the firms concerned are subject to bankruptcy 
and property laws which guarantee legal certainty 
and stability for the operation of  firms, and
(v) exchange rate conversions are carried out at the 
market rate.
The EU currently applies “cost adjustment” metho-
dology in some antidumping investigations for certain 
countries, whether market conditions predominate or 
not. This cost adjustment methodology is based on Ar-
ticle 2.2 of  the ADA, which states that the existence of  
a “particular market situation” justifies the adoption of  
a methodology that disregards production and adminis-
trative costs, sales and other expenses and profits from 
the country of  origin:
When there are no sales of  the like product in the 
ordinary course of  trade in the domestic market of  the 
exporting country or when, because of  the particular 
market situation or the low volume of  the sales in the 
domestic market of  the exporting country(2), such 
sales do not permit a proper comparison, the margin 
of  dumping shall be determined by comparison 
with a comparable price of  the like product when 
exported to an appropriate third country, provided 
that this price is representative, or with the cost of  
production in the country of  origin plus a reasonable 
amount for administrative, selling and general costs 
and for profits […]
Adoption of  the cost adjustment policy is thus war-
ned against, as the policy is being challenged by the 
EU’s trading partners within the WTO.16 As observed at 
the outset, it remains unclear how the new legal scena-
rio regarding Chinese economy status will be designed. 
16  Argentina v. European Union, EU- Antidumping Measures 
on Biodiesel from Argentina, DS473, (2014). Russia v. European 
Union, EU - Cost Adjustment Measures and Certain Antidump-
ing Measures on Imports from Russia, DS474, 2014. Indonesia v. 
European Union, EU - Antidumping Measures on Biodiesel from 
Indonesia, DS480, 2014.
5. analyzing China’s sui generis eConomy
The treatment China receives in antidumping in-
vestigations has been under discussion for many years. 
Overall, China is considered by economists and lawyers 
as an economy that does not operate under prevailing 
market conditions. But what, in the end, would such 
conditions look like in the Chinese context? The theo-
retical basis for the concept of  market economy was de-
veloped by classical economists who advocated classical 
liberalism, in particular Adam Smith and David Ricar-
do, between the 19th and 20th centuries, theorists who 
believed that protectionism and State intervention ge-
nerated economic inefficiencies. The theories of  Adam 
Smith, the precursor of  economic that the definition of  
a market economy is, in general, related to the degree 
of  State interference liberalism, are basically structured 
around a concern for economic growth, that is, around 
the factors that lead to increased productivity of  labor 
and distribution to different classes of  society.17 All the-
se theories involve the notion that the State should not 
intervene in the economy; it should only guarantee free 
competition between economic agents and the right 
to private property when it is threatened during social 
upheavals. Analysis of  the theories of  Smith and Ricar-
do demonstrates in the economy of  the country. Few 
countries have anything approaching wholly free trade 
or a full market economy,18 but ever since Adam Smith 
and David Ricardo, economists have defined free trade 
as an ideal towards which trade policy should strive. 
It is based on the theories developed by these and re-
lated economists that an understanding of  what charac-
terizes a “market economy” was created. Yet there is no 
concrete and unified definition of  “market economy,” 
and each individual country or organization confers its 
own certain peculiarities and requirements to the con-
cept. To take one example, in explaining the idea of  the 
“invisible hand”, Krugman identifies the salient features 
of  what he means by market economy:
[...] the US has a market economy, where production 
and consumption are the result of  decentralized 
decisions by businesses and individuals. There is 
no central authority telling people what to produce 
and where to carry it. Each individual does what it 
is believed to be more profitable; each consumer 
17 KRUGMAN, Paul; OBSTFELD, Maurice. Economia internac-
ional: teoria e política. 6. ed. São Paulo: Pearson, 2009.
18  Krugman cites the city of  Hong Kong as one of  the only 
modern economies without tariffs or import quotas.
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chooses its buys. 19
Krugman adds that market economies “are able to 
coordinate extremely complex activities and guarantee 
consumers the supply of  the goods and services requi-
red.” Drawing a parallel to what a non-market economy 
would resemble, Krugman affirms that “the alternative 
to a market economy is a command economy, where 
there is a central authority making decisions about pro-
duction and consumption.”20
The economist David Ricardo, in his development 
of  Adam Smith’s theory, proposes a theory of  “Com-
parative Advantages.” In his book, Principles of  Political 
Economy and Taxation (1817), Ricardo contests Smith’s 
assertion that a country should specialize in producing 
merchandise where it has an absolute advantage, and 
instead argues that it should focus on producing in areas 
where it has greater relative advantages, usually related 
to the lower costs of  production. The theory of  Com-
parative Advantages, as well as other theories developed 
by Ricardo, helped to form the basis and direction for 
the development of  a line of  theories of  international 
trade during the 20th century that came to dominate the 
international scene and remains largely relevant in the 
current economic and foreign trade scholarly literature.
The World Bank, for one, although it has never is-
sued a definition for market economy, has identified the 
conditions it considers relevant in the characterization 
of  an economy as such, including minimal State inter-
ference. The World Bank argues that a market economy 
is not one in which the State is absent; on the contra-
ry, State intervention is considered essential since in its 
absence market economies would succumb to mono-
polies. On the other hand, State intervention must be 
moderated in order to avoid favoring specific sectors, 
uniform pricing, and other State practices that impede 
competitive market dynamics.21
In the context of  the WTO, certain perceptions re-
garding the concept of  market economy can be noted 
19  KRUGMAN, Paul; WELLS, Robin. Introdução à economia. Rio 
de Janeiro: Campus, 2007.
20  KRUGMAN, Paul; WELLS, Robin. Introdução à economia. Rio 
de Janeiro: Campus, 2007.
21  Although the World Bank has not explicitly defined what a 
market economy is, in its reports and studies, especially on coun-
tries in transition to market economies, in the 1990s, some patterns 
can be observed. A World Bank Country Study On Czechoslovakia, 
ECA Sector Units World Bank, (1991). Available at: <http://docu-
ments.worldbank.org/curated/pt/197971468746734285/Czecho-
slovakia-Transition-to-a-market-economy>.
in Interpretative Note 1.2 to Article VI of  the GATT 
1994, as noted earlier in this article by the Appellate 
Body in EC v. Fasterners.22 Combining an analysis of  this 
excerpt from the Appellate Body’s decision mentioned 
above in this article with the text of  Interpretative Note 
1.2 to Article VI of  the GATT 1994 indicates the exis-
tence of  different levels of  economies that may not be 
considered market-oriented. This is because, for the 
purposes of  invoking the Interpretative Note, a total or 
substantial monopoly of  trade must exist in the expor-
ting country targeted by the antidumping investigation, 
as must price fixing by the State.
The lack of  a concrete legal definition allows Mem-
ber States to decide the issue based on a wide range 
of  diverse criteria, such as exchange rates, interest rates, 
wages, prices, capital controls and political factors. In 
EU law, for example, there are no criteria that determine 
when a country is to be considered a market economy. 
The EU has created a non-exhaustive list of  countries, 
however, where, according to the bloc, market condi-
tions are presumed not to prevail. Notwithstanding, this 
regulation neglects to indicate the criteria that must be 
met for a country to be removed from the list23.
Yet the EU has analyzed China’s situation and the pos-
sibility of  considering the country a market economy in 
certain circumstances. In 2008, China requested market 
economy recognition from the EU. In its Report publi-
shed in September 2008,24 the European Commission’s 
application of  the “5 Criteria” indicated in Article 2.7 (c) 
of  the EU’s Antidumping Regulation is evident.25 This 
article identifies the requirements that a group of  com-
panies or industries from countries where market condi-
tions do not prevail must comply to receive market eco-
nomy treatment in antidumping investigations.
22  EC – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or 
Steel Fasteners from China. Appellate Body Report. DS397:2011, 
parag. 285.
23 The first list dates from 1968 and includes all then communist 
countries except Cuba. This list has been modified on occasion, hav-
ing shrunk significantly following the breakup of  the Soviet Union 
in 1989.
24 Commission Of  The European Communities, Commission 
Staff  Working Document On Progress By The People’s Repub-
lic Of  China Towards Graduation To Market Economy Status 
In Trade Defense Investigations, No 1225/2009, (2008). Avail-
able at:  <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/april/tra-
doc_146035.pdf>. 
25  Criterion reached by China was: 2) An absence of  state-in-
duced distortions in the operation of  enterprises linked to privatiza-
tion and the use of  non-market trading or compensation system. 
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US antidumping legislation only generally defines 
what comprises a non-market economy country. Under 
Section 771 (18) of  the Tariff  Law of  1930, a non-ma-
rket economy would exist in a country where marke-
ting principles of  cost and pricing do not operate and, 
therefore, the sale prices of  goods do not reflect fair 
value. The criteria used in the US to determine whe-
ther a country is a market economy correspond only 
partially to the EU approach. The US Department of  
Commerce (DC) takes into account the extent of  state 
control over the means of  production, resource alloca-
tion and business decision-making. The DC also exa-
mines currency manipulation, free wage bargaining and 
private or public foreign investment. The regulation is 
not fully defined and allows the DC to consider other 
factors deemed appropriate, such as the existence and 
functioning of  anti-monopoly laws and stock exchange 
transactions.26 
The US conducts an annual review entitled “USTR 
Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance” (Re-
port), which analyses nine major areas of  trade in the 
WTO in which China has made commitments. In addi-
tion, the Report also provides an analysis of  the internal 
policies adopted by the Chinese Government that affect 
its business practice.27 In the last Report, published in 
2015, it focused on: (i) discriminatory trade practices; 
(ii) taxation; (iii) subsidies; (iv) price control; (v) stan-
dardization, technical regulations, transparency; (vi) 
state-owned enterprises. Especially with regard to go-
vernment-controlled enterprises, the Report has main-
tained that the Chinese Government is heavily involved 
in investments and decisions in strategic sectors such 
as civil aviation, electric power, petrochemical, marine 
and telecommunications. About 82% of  the assets of  
central state-owned enterprises are concentrated in the 
petrochemical, electric power, defense, telecommunica-
tions, transportation, mining, metallurgy and machinery 
sectors. According to the document, since the begin-
ning of  the global economic crisis at the end of  2008, 
there have been a large number of  mergers and acqui-
sitions among state-owned enterprises. Consequently, 
the Report, while indicating gradual progress by the 
Chinese Government, has concluded that a high degree 
26  ANTI-DUMPING Investigations Against China in Latin 
America. IBA Divisions Project, IBA Trade and Customs Law Com-
mittee and the IBA Latin American Regional Forum. p. 11.  (2010).
27  UNITED STATES Trade representative. 2014 report to con-
gress on China’s WTO compliance, 2014. 
of  state interference still exists in China, as reflected by 
its control practices for prices, means of  production, 
exchange rates and wages.
The Report concludes that state-owned enterprises 
continue to play a key role in China’s political economy 
even after more than three decades of  experimental 
and gradual reforms and private sector expansion. Ac-
cording to the Report, since the Chinese government 
started using state-owned enterprises as a mechanism 
to pursue social, industrial and foreign policy objecti-
ves, these companies have benefited from direct and 
indirect subsidies (capital, energy and property), as well 
as regulatory preferences (e.g., competition law, public 
contracts), which resulted in a regime that is highly res-
trictive for foreign direct investment.
From the perspective of  the US Government, the-
se privileges allow Chinese state-owned enterprises 
to maintain a monopolistic position in certain sectors 
although they often perform less efficiently and pro-
fitably than private-sector firms. While controlled com-
panies – around 155,000 local and central state-owned 
enterprises (according to data from 2013) – account for 
30% of  total secondary and tertiary assets, or more than 
50% of  China’s total corporate industrial assets, and ab-
sorb most of  state-backed loans, these enterprises only 
represent 22% of  Chinese profits and 17% of  total em-
ployment, and are also surpassed by the private sector in 
terms of  job creation and innovation.
It is worth noticing that the “Trade Policy Report” 
(TPR) on China published by the WTO in June 2016 
affirms that China continues to maintain an economic 
system in which the basic mainstay is public ownership 
of  property. As a result, the private sector is dominant 
in industries such as textiles and food, while sectors 
of  strategic importance – energy, utilities, transporta-
tion, telecommunications services, education, finance 
– remain only partially open to private investment.28 In 
addition to the Chinese government’s control over lo-
cal enterprises, the Chinese government’s price controls 
and fixing also attracts a good amount of  attention, as 
the modification of  economic data in a way that privi-
leges China’s domestic industry is also suspected. The 
WTO’s China TPR indicated that China applies price 
controls at both central and provincial levels on goods 
and services it deems to have a direct impact on the na-
28  Trade Policy Review Body, WTO Secretariat, Trade Policy Re-
view Body. WTO. 2016.
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tional economy and people’s subsistence. The products 
and services that are subject to price controls are listed 
in Central Government and Local Government Price 
Catalogs. The China TPR also indicated that products 
and services subject to government fixed prices include 
pharmaceuticals, tobacco, natural gas and certain tele-
communications services; while products and services 
subject to the government-mandated pricing policy in-
cluded gasoline, kerosene, diesel oil, fertilizers, cotton, 
edible oils, various grains, wheat flour, various forms 
of  transportation services, professional services such as 
engineering and architecture, and certain telecommu-
nication services. From the analysis of  the documents 
mentioned above it can be asserted that China conti-
nues to apply price controls on goods and services that 
have a direct impact on its national economy, practices 
that sustain the doubts and concerns regarding the de-
gree to which its hybrid economy can be characterized 
as a market economy.
6. an analysis of artiCles 15 (a) and 15 (d) 
through the lens of the vienna Convention 
on the law of treaties 
The treaties concluded within the framework of  the 
WTO were negotiated by many parties over an exten-
ded period and, therefore, divergent interpretations of  
the precise text of  an agreement or specific article are 
quite common. Article 15 of  the Protocol of  Accession 
is one such example where a multilateral negotiation 
process led to an international treaty termed a single 
undertaking of  the WTO that is not technically perfect, 
for it contains gaps that open space for a series of  dou-
bts and interpretations. As the Article involves an in-
ternational trade rule, Articles 31 and 32 of  the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of  Treaties (VCLT) stand out as 
tools of  interpretation in addition to the general princi-
ples of  international law and the WTO’s jurisprudence.
Article 3.2 of  the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(“DSU”) emphasizes the importance of  customary ru-
les and sources of  international law, emphasizing the 
need for the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) to rely 
on the usual practices of  international law to clarify 
possible disagreements involving the provisions of  the 
WTO agreements. For this reason, the WTO panels and 
Appellate Body make constant references to Articles 31 
and 32 of  the VCLT, which codify the customary ru-
les of  treaty interpretation. The WTO Appellate Body, 
as well as other prestigious international organizations, 
have emphasized that the rules of  interpretation establi-
shed in the VCLT constitute accepted customs of  inter-
national law.29 The VCLT deals with the interpretation 
of  treaties in three separate articles – Articles 31, 32 and 
33 – which form a coherent and harmonious system to 
guide hermeneutical analysis. The VCLT’s authors were 
aware from the outset of  the difficulties that arise from 
the diversity of  meanings words possess. This was the 
reason why Article 31 holds that the “ordinary mea-
ning” of  a treaty should be determined in accordance 
with the treaty’s context, object and purpose.
We first address a textual analysis of  Article 15 (a) 
and 15 (d) of  the Protocol of  Accession. Article 15 (a) 
deals with the comparability of  prices determined in 
antidumping investigations, which involves comparing 
export price and normal value pursuant to Article 2.1 
of  the Antidumping Agreement. The article provides 
two alternatives for the calculation of  normal value in 
antidumping investigations related to China’s exports: 
(i) the use of  Chinese prices and costs in the indus-
try under investigation or (ii) an alternative methodo-
logy. Article 15 (a) (i) states that Member States may 
use Chinese prices or costs in cases where producers 
in the industry under investigation clearly demonstra-
te that market conditions prevail in that sector. In this 
case, the burden of  proof  to demonstrate that market 
conditions prevail in the investigated sector rests upon 
Chinese exporters.30 If  the Chinese exporter cannot 
prove that free market rules prevail in its sector, Arti-
cle 15 (a) (ii) should be applied. Article15 (a) (ii) states 
that an alternative methodology may be used for price 
comparison in an antidumping investigation. As noted 
earlier, the provisions of  Article 15 (a) do not explicitly 
indicate that China is not a market economy. However, 
by requiring Chinese exporter to produce evidence of  
its market character, it is implied that in certain Chinese 
sectors market conditions do not prevail – an interpre-
tation confirmed later in the text of  Article 15 (d) of  
29 US Gasoline, DS2, Appelate Body Report, 1996, parag. 16-17. 
Us Gambling, DS285, Panel Report. 2005.
30  In the United States there is no news of  any case in which 
market economy treatment was granted to individual Chinese pro-
ducers. On the other hand, the European Commission has already 
recognized market conditions for Chinese exporters in some cases. 
See: Antidumping Investigations Against China in Latin America, 
2010, at 10.
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the Protocol of  Accession and discussed in detail below. 
It is precisely this mechanism that allows Member 
States to adopt alternative methodologies when deter-
mining the normal value of  Chinese imports by sub-
jecting goods of  Chinese origin to the same treatment 
as imports from non-market economy countries. From 
the analysis of  the Working Group for the Accession of  
China to the WTO, it can be concluded that the use of  
alternative methodologies to calculate normal value in 
antidumping investigations was considered appropriate 
because of  difficulties related to the special characte-
ristics of  the Chinese domestic market.31 The absence 
of  a regular trade environment and the high level of  
State interference in the economy were considered as 
characteristics that would have the effect of  rendering 
antidumping investigations based on Chinese domes-
tic prices impossible. A similar mechanism had already 
been planned in the Working Group for the Accession 
of  Vietnam to the WTO.32 The Working Group for the 
Accession of  China to the WTO, when referring to Ar-
ticle 15 of  the Protocol of  Accession, states that33:
Several members of  the Working Party noted that 
China was continuing the process of  transition 
towards a full market economy. Those members 
noted that under those circumstances, in the case 
of  imports of  Chinese origin into a WTO Member, 
special difficulties could exist in determining 
cost and price comparability in the context of  
antidumping investigations and countervailing duty 
investigations. Those members stated that in such 
cases, the importing WTO Member might find it 
necessary to take into account the possibility that a 
strict comparison with domestic costs and prices in 
China might not always be appropriate. 
The Working Group for the Accession of  China to 
the WTO drew attention to the consequences of  the 
WTO system on economies where market conditions 
did not prevail without, notwithstanding, providing a 
definition of  exactly how a market economy should be 
identified. 
What is possible to observe in Article 15 (a) of  the 
Protocol of  Accession is that, especially if  compared to 
the general rule in the Interpretative Note to Article VI 
31  Even if  the text of  the Reports of  the Working Group is not 
considered as part of  the text or context, under the terms of  Article 
31 of  the CVDT, they may constitute additional instruments of  in-
terpretation, pursuant to Article 32 of  the CVDT.
32  WTO. Report of  the Working Group on Vietnam Access to 
the WTO, WT/ACC/CHN/49, parag. 255, (2001).
33  WTO. Report of  the Working Group on Vietnam Access to 
the WTO, WT/ACC/CHN/49, parag. 150 (2001).
of  the GATT 1994, the Protocol does guarantee more 
favorable treatment for Chinese exporters to the degree 
that it foresees the possibility of  allowing them to prove 
that market economy conditions prevail in their respec-
tive sectors. It seems clear that Article 15 (a) is intended 
to guarantee Chinese exporters the right to avoid alter-
native methods for determining normal value by provi-
ding them an opportunity to demonstrate that market 
conditions are prevalent in their sector. In addition, the 
use of  alternative methodologies is established by the 
article only as a subsidiary alternative, which reduces the 
chances of  abusive calculations by other Member States.
We now turn to the analysis of  Article 15 (d), whose 
interpretation is directly related to Article 15 (a). The 
hypothesis contemplated in the first sentence of  Article 
15 (d) concerns the recognition of  China as a market 
economy by a Member State in view of  its domestic 
law, in which case the provisions of  Article 15 (a) would 
remain without effect. According to the first part of  Ar-
ticle 15 (d), once a country has determined that China 
represents a market economy, there would be no justifi-
cation for applying alternative methodologies based on 
the absence of  market conditions. Another possibility 
foreseen in the final part of  Article 15 (d) arises if  Chi-
na proves that market conditions prevail in a specific 
sector or industry, but not in its entire economy. In that 
case, the provisions of  Article 15 (a) would no longer 
apply to these specific sectors. Here it is essential to 
note the particularities of  Article 15 (a) and 15 (d). The 
provisions of  Article15 (a) refer to a “Chinese produ-
cer” that can demonstrate market conditions specifically 
with respect to the object under investigation. Thus, the 
analysis from the point of  view of  Article 15 (a) must 
be carried out on a case-by-case basis, depending on the 
details and peculiarities of  each sector and each product 
being investigated. In turn, Article 15 (d) says that Chi-
na may prove to Member States that market conditions 
prevail generally or in relation to a specific industry. 
Thus, the recognition under Article 15 (d) could have 
an erga omnes effect, covering all Chinese producers or all 
producers of  the area specifically analyzed.
The second part of  Article 15 (d) contains the most 
controversial point, since it states that “in any event, the 
provisions of  subparagraph (a)(ii) shall expire 15 years 
after the date of  accession”. It states that after 15 years 
from China’s accession to the WTO, that is, on Decem-
ber 11, 2016, the provisions of  Article 15 (a) (ii), which 
determine the use of  alternative methodology for com-
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parison purposes in antidumping investigations against 
Chinese imports, would cease to have effect. As already 
noted, extensive debate and competing interpretations 
currently surround this issue. The WTO Appellate Body 
has already argued that the text of  an agreement should 
be analyzed in parallel with its context, object and pur-
pose.34 Sir Sinclair, who participated as delegate to the 
Vienna Conference when the VCLT was approved, no-
ted that the true meaning of  a text must be reached 
in the light of  all the consequences that flow naturally 
and reasonably from that text.35 Therefore, it is essential 
to ascertain the purpose of  the signatory parties to the 
Protocol of  Accession by providing for the transitional 
application of  a special system for the determination 
of  normal value for Chinese imports under investiga-
tion.36 For him the essential question is whether it was 
the intention of  the signatory parties of  the Protocol 
of  Accession to automatically designate China as a ma-
rket economy in December 2016 regardless of  its actual 
economic practices.
From the analysis of  the above-mentioned posi-
tions, the assertion that the expiration of  Article 15 (a) 
(ii) automatically grants market economy status to Chi-
na seems excessively rigid and disregards the remaining 
provisions of  Article 15 of  the Protocol of  Accession.37 
First of  all, according to analysis of  the Chinese eco-
nomy, the Chinese Government still maintains an active 
and relevant role in its industrial sector. The very en-
dorsement of  another Five-Year Plan indicates that the 
Chinese state will likely continue to have considerable 
influence on the country’s trade practices in order to 
comply with the measures and achieve the goals iden-
tified by the Communist Party. As a result, considering 
the reality and the factual context of  Chinese economy, 
the automatic concession of  market economy status 
might go against the objectives and purpose of  the Pro-
tocol of  Accession and to the antidumping legislation 
as a whole, which are, respectively, (i) the gradual emer-
gence of  the Chinese market in international trade, with 
liberalization of  its trade and respect for free market ru-
34  JAPAN v. Canada, Canada - certain measures affecting the au-
tomotive industry, DS139, 807, 2000. EUROPEAN communities v. 
United States, US - Trade Act, DS200, 7.22, 638, 2000. 
35 SINCLAIR, Ian. The Vienna convention and the law of  treaties. 2. ed. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984. 130-31.
36  EUROPEAN Communities v. Japan, Japan - Taxes on Alco-
holic Beverages, DS8, 1996.
37 This type of  rigid analysis has been studied by the Appellate 
Body in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 1996.
les; and (ii) a fair comparison of  prices in antidumping 
investigations, in order to protect Member States from 
unfair trade practices and, at the same time, protect Chi-
na from protectionist measures against their exports.
Secondly, Article 32 lists the preparatory works as 
one of  the supplementary sources of  treaty interpre-
tation. It is therefore important that Article 15 (a) of  
the Protocol of  Accession be read in conjunction with 
paragraph 150 of  the Working Group for the Acces-
sion of  China to the WTO. This paragraph defends and 
allows the application of  alternative methodology for 
value comparison purposes in antidumping investiga-
tions in certain situations in order to ensure fair com-
parison of  prices. In addition, it should be noted that, 
although there is no automatic recognition of  China as 
a market economy, the Chinese Government and pro-
ducers retain the guarantee and the right to demonstrate 
that market rules prevail in certain sectors under the ter-
ms of  the remaining provisions of  Article 15 (the first 
and third parts of  Article 15 (a) (i) and 15 (d). As the 
provisions of  Article 15 (a) (i) and parts one and three 
of  Article 15 (d) will remain in force, the most plausible 
interpretation is that it will also remain the right of  the 
Chinese exporting producer and the Chinese Govern-
ment to defend and prove the existence of  market con-
ditions for a specific or general industry, in the unlikely 
event that a Member State’s investigation attests to the 
absence of  market conditions in that industry.
On the other hand, it seems reasonable to recognize 
that the reversal of  the burden of  proof  regarding price 
comparison in antidumping investigations will be man-
datory after December 2016, since the extinction of  
Article 15 (a) (ii) means that characterizations of  China 
as a non-market economy subsequent to December 11, 
2016 can no longer find their legal basis in the Protocol 
of  Accession, which would constitute legal abuse from 
that date. International law forbids the abusive exercise 
of  rights from a State and requires that treaty obliga-
tions be performed reasonably and in good faith. It is 
not reasonable to assert that the extinction of  Article 
15 (a) (ii) will not result in any change in the legal order 
of  the antidumping legislation. Such an understanding, 
while voiding the letter of  Article 15 (a) (ii) counter to 
the principle of  effectiveness, would likely incentivize 
abusive exercise by the Member States of  their trade 
defense right, thus resulting in a violation of  Chinese 
rights and the transitional nature of  the Protocol of  
Accession.
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This said, the dispositions Article 15 constitute 
complementary rules specifying Article 6 of  the GATT 
1994 and the ADA, which governs price comparability 
in the context of  antidumping investigations. In case of  
extinction of  this special rule, the Member States may 
use the remaining general rules provided for in Article 
6 of  the GATT 1994 and the ADA. The multilateral 
system of  the WTO constitutes a single undertaking, 
which means that every negotiated item is part of  a sin-
gle and indivisible package that cannot be agreed upon, 
read and interpreted separately, but rather jointly and 
systematically.38 Therefore, it is most likely that from 
December 2016 on Member States will have to return 
to the provisions set forth in Article 6 of  the GATT 
1994, as well as in the ADA, more specifically in the 
Interpretative Note to the GATT 1994.
It is worth noting that the Interpretative Note was 
drawn up in 1955, almost sixty-two years ago and in 
a completely different historical context in which the 
world was divided between planned economies and 
market economies: socialist systems versus capitalist 
system. In the current political-economic panorama, 
however, it may be reckless to draw such divisions, even 
for China since, although there is strong state interven-
tion in economic circles, it cannot be wholly considered 
a planned economy, but more accurately as a sui generis 
economy from the perspective of  international trade. 
Another possibility that should be considered is the su-
ggestion by the legal department of  the European Par-
liament cost and price adjustment techniques be adop-
ted based on Article 2.2 of  the ADA. However, any cost 
adjustment policy by Member States would likely face 
serious obstacles. In a recent analysis, the European 
Parliament’s Public Policy Body acknowledged that 
[...] the nature of  state intervention in China can 
be so intense that it is very difficult to detect 
state subsidies – and hence other price and cost 
distortions of  production for the purposes of  price 
adjustment [...]. 
Thus, importing authorities may encounter difficulty 
collecting sufficient information and making appropria-
te cost adjustments in investigations.39 
38 The concept of  single undertaking is the principle of  interna-
tional trade, defined in: <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dda_e/work_organi_e.htm>.
39 BARONE, Barbara. One year to go: the debate over China‘s mar-
ket economy status (MES) heats up. 2015.
7. final Considerations
The debate over the possible interpretations of  Ar-
ticle 15 of  the Protocol of  Accession is of  great im-
portance and currently represents, as mentioned be-
fore, one of  the most discussed topics in political and 
commercial circles. Chinese growth, as reflected in its 
political, economic and military influence, has altered 
the existing global order. On December 12, 2016, that 
is, the day after the date established by Article 15 (d) of  
the Protocol of  Accession, China notified the WTO Se-
cretariat that it challenged the calculation methodology 
used by the US and the EU in antidumping investiga-
tions. China did not, however, propose any argument 
related to the most appropriate interpretation of  the 
Article in question. Rather, China based its challenge on 
an understanding that Article 15 (d) would immediately 
and without question apply starting December 11, 2016.
Without doubt, automatic recognition of  China as 
a market economy in antidumping investigations would 
defy antidumping law as a whole, since the ultimate pur-
poses of  the Protocol of  Accession, the application of  
the alternative methodology and main goal of  antidum-
ping law are all to avoid distortions in dumping mar-
gin calculations. WTO law has developed appropriate 
methods to accommodate China and its sui generis eco-
nomy within the multilateral trading system through se-
veral concessions by Chinese State. However, the recent 
change in the antidumping legislation represents a new 
challenge for the WTO. On one side, the Organization 
must consider not only China’s claims that the rules of  
the Protocol of  Accession are eminently transitional 
and, thus, cannot persist indefinitely, but also the poli-
tical, economic and commercial strength and influence 
of  China today. On the other hand, WTO must also 
evaluate Chinese progress in implementing the WTO’s 
rules and in liberalizing trade in view of  relevant inter-
national studies by the US and the EU that maintain 
that China cannot yet be considered a market economy. 
When China entered the WTO in 2001, the political-
-economic outlook was completely different from the 
one that exists today, and therefore the analysis to be 
made by the DSB must necessarily display a broad foun-
dation in international law, especially in the principles 
established by the VCLT.
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